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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action commenced by plaintiff.
penelko, Inc., for claimed violation of certain provisions
in its lease of real property and for tortious interference
with its theater business.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial by jury, a verdict was rendered
against appellant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount
of $65,000.

The lower court entered its judgment on the

verdict in the sum of $65.000 and denied appellant's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative. for a remittitur, or a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant. Price Rentals, Inc., seeks reversal of the
lower court's judgment.
FACTS
A.

Lea_s_es And~reements__Pertaining To 9400 South
Shopping Center.

On March 25, 1972, defendants Malstrom leased a parcel
of real property located on 9400 South and 700 East, Sandy,
Utah. to plaintiff for the construction and operation of a
theater business (Pages 3, 1713 and 1714).

Subsequently.

on January 17. 1975. defendants Malstrom notified plaintiff
that they had agreed to lease a large portion of their property to defendant-appellant, Price Rentals, Inc., for the
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purpose of constructing a shopping center (Pages 1779, 1780,
1989 and 1990).

The lease agreement was to include the

property upon which the plaintiff's theater and an adjacent laundromat (owned by two of plaintiff's directors and
officers) were located, and provided that appellant was to
take the property subject to the lease rights of plaintiff
and the laundromat owners (Page 1197).

Accordingly, on

March 27, 1975, defendants Malstrom executed a formal Offer
to Lease in which Price Rentals was given an option to lease
two contiguous parcels of real property at the above location (Pages '338 and 1839).
On September 28, 1975. appellant exercised its option
on the first parcel and entered into a Lease Agreement with
defendants Malstrom for that parcel (Pages 1838 and 1839).
Appellant then entered into a Lease Agreement with Grand
Central, and a Grand Central store was constructed on the
leased parcel immediately to the northeast of plaintiff's
theater (Page 1197).

In addition, approximately 1,200 park-

ing stalls were constructed immediately south of Grand Central and immediately to the east of plaintiff's leasehold.
(Note:

This lease, as well as the other exhibits introduced

at trial, were not transmitted with the record).
With the permission and consent of defendants Malstrom,
appellant entered into a Lease Agreement with Perkins' Cake
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& Steak Restaurant on December 20, 1976 (Page 1791).

on

March 28. 1977, appellant then formally exercised its option
on the second large parcel of property, of which plaintiff's
leasehold was a part (Page 1197).

On April 4. 1977, appel-

lant entered into a Construction Agreement with Jack L. Kerbs,
Inc., for the construction by Kerbs of the Perkins' restaurant
on a parcel of property between the Grand Central common parking lot on the east and the common parking area located to
the south of plaintiff's theater (Pages 1792 and 1795).
B.

Plaintiff's Lease.

The Lease between defendants Malstrom and plaintiff,
dated March 25, 1972, expressly provided for the lease to
plaintiff of a parcel of real property measuring 70' x 120'
"together with parking space and access to be set aside and
allotted as hereinafter more particularly described."
8).
by

(Page

Paragraph 2 of said Lease provided for the construction
plaintiff of a building on the leased premises for use

as a motion picture theater.

Paragraph 3 then provided:

There is hereby allotted to the Lessee for parking,
a strip of land 70 feet in width and 234 feet in
depth. running from the South side of the above
described parcel to the North side of 9400 South
Street, and an additional tract 40 feet in width
and 162 feet in depth. from the parcel next adjoining the West side of this tract. • . • The
Lessee shall install and maintain at~de
established by the Lessor and in accordance with
the standard of the Albertson's parking lot, all
~ving, lighting, curbs and gutter~s, sidewalks
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This paragraph was inserted in the Lease because no curbs,
gutters, sidewalks or traffic control improvements had then
been constructed along 9400 South and the common parking
area, and it was contemplated that the city would soon
require such items as the shopping center was developed
(Pages 1762-1766. 2177-2179).
Under Paragraph 6, plaintiff agreed to the removal and
replacement of all signs previously erected by it with a
sign in conformity with the rules and regulations of a merchant's association which was to be developed in the shopping center, but which had not been formed at the time of
the trial of this case.

Again,

it was understood that such

changes would be made in light of the contemplated shopping
center development (Pages 1762-1769. 2177-2179).

Plaintiff

then agreed in Paragraph 7 as follows:
All parking facilities, lj_ghti~ili t:ie3 and
9_pen_spaces upon the lea~~emises are to_be
used in common with other occupants of property
of the Lessor for the maintenance and de~elopment:
of a shopping center and no barriers shall be constructed or permitted which will bar access to
such parking facilities and access roads by tenants of other premises or their customers or guests.
The Lessor shall provide in leases of adjoining
property similar covenants and agreements so that
the Lessee shall have similar unobstructed access
to parking, lighting and other common facilities
of adjoining tenants.
(Emphasis added).
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Paragraph 8 of the Lease further provided:
I t is the_ int_e_ntion _9_f__the~rties that this
shall be ~ lea~~o~ l~nd onlY_ for the purpose of
construction of bu1ld1ngs or i~ovements in connection with an integrated sh~pp1n9-cen~~
both Q_f the_e_arties hereto will encourage the
~~velQ_Ement of adjoining properties for suchpurpose. .
(Emphasis added).
-

On July 1, 1977, plaintiff and defendants Malstrom entered
into an Addendum to Lease and Agreement relating to the interpretation of certain provisions of the March 25, 1972 Lease
and to certain claimed defaults under the terms of said Lease
{Page 18).

A lawsuit had previously been filed by the Malstroms

against plaintiff, in which the Malstroms alleged that plaintiff had defaulted in the performance of certain terms and
conditions of its Lease.

That suit was resolved and an Ad-

dendum to the original Lease of March 25. 1972, was agreed
upon as a part of the settlement (Page 1993). Accordingly,
Paragraph 4 of that Addendum provided:
The Lessor does hereby acknowledge and confirm
that as of the date hereof [July 1, 1977] Lessee
is in full and current compliance in all respects
as Tenant with all terms, provisions and covenants
of said Lease and Agreement dated March 25, 1972,
as amended hereby, and Lessee does hereby acknowledge and confirm that as of the date hereof Lessor
is in full and current compliance in all respects
as Landlord with all terms, provisions and covenants of said Lease and Agreement dated March 27,
1972, which Lease and Agreement is as to both
Lessee and Lessor in good standing and subject to
no defaults.
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The Addendum did not change any of the original Lease provisions quoted above.
As of the date of the Addendum between plaintiff and
defendants Malstrom (July 1, 1977), the contractor for the
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant had poured the footings
and foundations in connection with the construction of the
restaurant and had completed the framing of the restaurant
The precise location of ~he building in relation

building.

to plaintiff's theater and the common parking area to the
south of the theater was therefore plainly apparent (Pages
2295 and 2298).

Prior to the execution of the Addendum,

however, plaintiff had not complained about nor objected to
the construction of the restaurant, but rather acknowledged
that the Landlord of the shopping center was in full compliance with all terms of plaintiff's Lease at that time (Pages
3 and 894).
C.

Construction Of Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant And Relocation Of Chantel Theater Sign.

During the negotiation of a permit with Sandy City for
the construction of the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant.
representatives of Price Rentals, in consultation with Sandy
City officials, submitted several drafts of site plans to
the Sandy City Planning Department as part of the conditional
use permit (C.U.P.) process (Pages 2138-2141, 2148, 2149,
1808, 1809, 1855).

Sandy City finally approved a site plan,

-6-
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but initiated certain changes in the plans submitted (Page
1856).

Sandy City then issued a building permit conditioned

upon compliance by Price Rentals of certain requirements
imposed by the City (Pages 1809-1812, 1852-1861, 2141-2144,
2148-2151).

These requirements included:

(a) construction

of a driveway immediately to the west of Perkins' Cake &
steak Restaurant, extending into common parking areas of
the center- approximately half of which was located on the
common parking area immediately south of plaintiff's theater,
and the other half of which was located on the property leased
by Perkins' Cake &

Steak~

(b) construction of a landscaped

area adjoining 9400 South and located immediately to the
west of the driveway entrance as a traffic control device:
(c) removal of plaintiff's theater sign, as required by the
City since the sign was located in the middle of the driveway and therefore constituted a "traffic hazard": and (d)
construction of certain curb, guttering and sidewalks in
accordance with the master plan for Sandy City, and as was
contemplated in the lease.
Because the issuance of an occupancy certificate for the
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant by Sandy City was expressly
conditioned upon removal of plaintiff's theater sign, representatives of Price Rentals attempted in June, 1977, to obtain
plaintiff's approval for the relocation of plaintiff's theater
sign or the construction of a replacement sign (Pages 22982301, 2314).

Appellant agreed to bear the cost of the con-7-
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struction of such a sign, even though plaintiff had agreed
pursuant to Paragraph 7 of its Lease with the Malstroms "not
to construct or permit any barriers . . . which will bar
access to such (common) parking facilities and access roads
by tenants of other premises or their customers or guests"
(Pages 2284-2291. 2299-2300).

As previously noted, Para-

graph 8 of the Lease also committed both parties to "encourage the development of adjoining properties" for the
purpose of constructing "buildings and improvements" in
connection with an "integrated shopping center".

During

the course of said conversations, Marv Dobkins of Price
Rentals brought to the plaintiff's attention that the sign
constituted a traffic hazard and had to be relocated in
order to open the restaurant (Pages 2298-2305).

Following

various unsuccessful attempts to obtain plaintiff's cooperation in the relocation of the sign. Price Rentals informed
plaintiff in October and November, 1977, that the restaurant
would open on November 7, 1977, and that it would be necessary to remove and relocate the Chantel Theater sign in
accordance with Sandy City's requirements (Pages 2284-2291,
2299-2300).

Price Rentals also advised plaintiff that it

would relocate the sign at its own cost (Pages 2284-2291,
2299-2300).
The parties agreed that the sign would be relocated at
a location to be determined, although certain evidence per-
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taining to that agreement was not admitted by the Court
(Page 2292).

This matter is assigned as error and will be

discussed hereafter.

Accordingly, the sign was removed on

November 4, 1977, in accordance with the requirements of
sandy City (Page 2136).

Price Rentals immediately arranged

for a portable sign containing the name of the theater,
which was expected to be used for a brief period while the
sign was relocated in accordance with instructions to be
provided by plaintiff {Page 1985).

As of the time of trial,

Price Rentals had paid the entire cost of rental and lighting of the portable sign, which was displayed at the west
end of the landscaped island immediately adjacent to 9400
South (Page 1985).

Since the time of the initial offer of

sign replacement, Price Rentals made several specific proposals to replace plaintiff's sign with an attractive sign
in a location acceptable to plaintiff and Sandy City, although again, the Court refused to admit any evidence of
such proposals since they were made after the commencement
of the present action (Pages 2329-2331).

On each such oc-

casion, plaintiff either failed to respond to appellant's
proposal or refused to accept the proposal without stating
the reasons for such refusal or indicating what its sign
specifications were.

Again, however, the court refused to

permit the introduction of evidence in support of those
facts.

In addition, from the date of removal of plaintiff's
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theater sign on November 4. 1977, plaintiff deliberately
refused to construct a replacement sign or to relocate its
original sign, despite the fact that Sandy City would clearly
have permitted such a relocation (Pages 2318-2320).
D.

Nature Of Plaintiff's Claims.

Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Complaint (Page 3), plaintiff sought damages against each of the defendants, alleging
as follows:
1.

Since the execution of the Addendum to the

Lease on July 1. 1977, defendants entered into a "deliberate
and malicious course of conduct" in violation of the two
Leases, "designed to destroy the business of the plaintiff"
with the intent to "force plaintiff to forfeit and abandon
said Leases."
2.

Defendants entered into a Lease with Perkins'

Cake & Steak, which did not contain "similar covenants and
agreements" to those of Paragraph 7 of its lease. "so that
Lessee,

(plaintiff) shall have similar unobstructed access

to parking, lighting and other common facilities to the
joint tenants."
3.

Defendants tore down the sign and marquee

for plaintiff's theater.
4.

Defendants removed two lights that the plain-

tiff had installed on the parking space to the south of its
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space to the south of its theater.

(These lights were lo-

cated in the common parking area).
5.

Defendant Perkins' Cake & Steak erected a

proposed restaurant, blocking the view of the plaintiff's
marquee.
6.

Defendant Perkins' Cake & Steak "trespassed

on plaintiff's leased parking space by landscaping and by
asphalting over the same."
7.

Defendants constructed a flagpole on plain-

tiff's alleged leased parking space.
8.

Defendants have trespassed upon plaintiff's

leased parking area.
It is significant that at no time has Penelko claimed any
damage prior to July 1, 1977.

In fact, it specifically stated

in its Complaint and Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine
that it claimed no damage prior to that time (Pages 3 and 894).
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the Court submitted
all of the above claims to the jury in a single instruction,
without distinguishing between plaintiff's tort claims and
its claims for breach of lease.

The jury was therefore per-

mitted to return a general verdict without specifying the
nature of any wrongful conduct of any of the defendants.
Further, the court's Instruction No. 21 permitted the jury to
find any damages that would fairly and adequately compensate
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plaintiff for any injury sustained by defendants' wrongful conduct and then it stated:
Such damages may include damages from loss of
profits, ~f any, and punitive damages,--rf any. as
you may find pursuant to the next instructions
that follow.
(Emphasis added) (Page 1205).
The instruction, however, did not advise the jury that it
could not award any damages for the time period prior to
July 1, 1977, which was the date alleged in plaintiff's Complaint as the beginning date for defendants' alleged by wrongful conduct.

Instruction No. 21 also stated that compensa-

tion for wrongful damage to the plaintiff's property could
be awarded.

Finally, Paragraph 7 of Instruction No. 17, as

submitted to the jury, stated that the plaintiff was claiming
wrongful violation of its rights because of a willful and
malicious course of conduct by defendants designed to destroy
plaintiff's business and force abandonment of its theater
and lease.

This claim was clearly founded in tort, but the

jury was not instructed that in order to recover on this
claim, plaintiff must show that defendants' conduct proxi~ately

caused injury to plaintiff.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defendants
moved the court for a directed verdict with respect to the
issues of liability and damages in the case (Pages 22292232).

Specifically, defendants contended first, that

plaintiff, in the event defendants were found to be liable.
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was entitled to the recovery of lost "net profits" only,
and second. that plaintiff had scrupulously avoided putting
on any evidence to prove its "net income."

The court denied

said motion with respect to appellant and John Price personally (Page 2245). Defendants renewed their motion for a
directed verdict upon completion of their case, and again,
that motion was denied with respect to all of plaintiff's
claims (Pages 2455-2457, and 2469).

The court then sub-

mitted all of plaintiff's claims to the jury, and a general
verdict in the amount of $65,000.00 was returned against
appellant.
Appellant contends on appeal that this Court should:
(1) reverse the trial court's judgment on the verdict with
instructions that the trial court enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because of plaintiff's failure to produce any evidence of lost "net profits"; (2) reverse the
trial court's judgment on the basis that the above instructions were improper and that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the introduction of critical evidence relating
to (a) plaintiff's obligation to mitigate its damages, (b)
to the existence of an agreement between the parties for
the relocation of the sign, and (c) to the existence of a
laundromat lease for property contiguous to plaintiff's
theater, which also provided for common parking facilities;
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and (3) reverse the court's judgment because of the highly
prejudicial conduct of the court during the trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT.
In cases where a party seeks recovery for interference
with its business operations or for breach of contract, loss
of

~et

profits is the proper measure of recovery.

Leppla

v. Schroeder, 532 P.2d 370, 372 (Colo. 1974); Williams v.
Bone, 74 Idcno 185, 259 P.2d 810, 811-12 (1953); American
Fire Protection Service v. Williams, 340 P.2d 644, 647 (Cal.
1959):

~untert

v. City of Stockton, 126 Cal.Rptr. 690, 55

Cal.App.3d 131 (1976).

The term "net profits" is defined

as "the gains made from sales after deducting the value of
the labor, materials, rents and all expenses.

"

Guntert v. City of Stockton, supra, at 700.
A judgment in favor of plaintiff based on gross income
or calculated without proper proof of all expenses to arrive
at lost net profits must be reversed.

Williams v. Bone,

supra; _Benfiel_d v. H. K. Porter Co., 137 N.W.2d 273 (Mich.
1965).

In Benfield, for example, plaintiff introduced evi-

dence of lost gross receipts only but failed to offer proof
of proper allocable expenses to show its loss of "net profits."
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On appeal. the Court held that plaintiff had the burden of
showing loss of "net profits" and that proof of expenses is
part of that burden.

The judgment, which failed to take

into account deduction of properly allocable expenses from
lost gross receipts, was therefore reversed by the court
and the lower court was directed to enter a verdict of no
cause of action.

Id. at 274.

Similarly, in Williams v. Bone, supra, the Idaho Supreme
Court reviewed an appeal in which an operator of a taxicab
business brought an action against a lessee for removal of
the operator's neon sign which advertised his business.

To

prove loss of business subsequent to removal of the sign,
plaintiff submitted bank statements of gross business income
for a period of six months prior to the time the sign was
removed and for a period of six months after removal.

No

evidence was offered. however, with respect to "net loss"
or "net decrease in income."

The Court concluded that ex-

penses and costs of operation, from which the net profits
or decrease in net income could be derived, must be shown
by plaintiff.

The Court then stated:

Where a regular and established
jured, interrupted or destroyed
acts of another, the measure of
if recoverable, is the net loss
nution in gross income.

-15-
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[T]his Court [has] held that damages could
not be predicated on proof of gross receipts of
the business, and that such evidence standing
alone, is insufficient proof of damages.
259
P.2d at 812.
Because of plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of
such lost net profits, the Court therefore held that the
jury verdict and the judgment entered thereon should be
reversed.
As noted previously, plaintiff in this case also failed
to produce any evidence of lost "net prof its" at the trial
of the present case.

In fact, when counsel for appellant

attempted to cross-examine plaintiff's expert accountant
regarding the computation of certain entries on plaintiff's
tax returns in order to determine if he had calculated the
net income from plaintiff's theater business, the court refused to permit the examination (Pages 1931-1934).

As a

result, only evidence of gross receipts and gross income of
plaintiff's business, without proper deduction of expenses,
from 1973 to 1979 were before the jury (Pages 1905, 1906,
and 1913-1916).

The jury's verdict and the court's judgment

on the verdict, therefore, should be reversed because they
are based upon a false premise and the trial court should
be required to enter a judgment of no cause of action against
plaintiff.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE.
A.

The Court Failed To Instruct The Jury That
The_R_roper Me~sure Of Damages Was Loss Of
"Net Profits."

Instruction No. 21 stated that the jury could find any
damages that would fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff for any injury sustained by defendants' wrongful conduct
and that such damages could include "damages from loss of
profits, if any . . . . "

The instruction, however, did not

define "loss of profits" nor did it restrict such loss to
"net profits".

Accordingly, following preparation of the

court's instructions to the jury, appellant excepted to the
giving of Instruction No. 21.

Similarly, appellant objected

to the giving of Instruction No. 22 because that instruction
failed to define "lost profits", as that term was used in
the court's instructions, and to limit such lost profits to
"net profits" (Pages 2531 and 2532).
As stated above, the proper measure of damages in the
present case, as in other cases of alleged tortious interference with business and breach of contract, is the loss
of "net profits."

In order to determine net profits, it is

imperative that all expenses be deducted from a company's
gross income or receipts.

Guntert v. City of Stockton,

supra, at 700; Williams v. Bone, supra, at 812; Benfield v.
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~~·

Porter

C~,

supra, at 274.

An instruction defining

"net profits" must be submitted to the jury by the Court.
Leppla v. Schroeder, supra. at 372.

In addition, the jury

must be properly instructed as to the correct measure of
damages, which is clearly limited to lost "net profits",
not "gross profits".

Guntert v. City of Stockton,

supr~,

at 700-01.
Failure to give such an instruction in the present
case constituted prejudicial error which had the effect of
permitting the jury to determine damages by use of a false
standard. In this regard, it is significant that the reduction of gross Feceipts from the operation of plaintiff's
theater from January 1, 1977, to April 1, 1979, and the
jury's verdict of $65,000.00 are almost identical.

The

calculations of plaintiff's expert accountant, for example,
show the following declines in gross revenue (using 1976 as
a base year) during the above time period (Pages 1912-1915):
1977

$ 20,306.84

19 78

39,288.73
5,332.04

1979 (first 3 months)
Total:

$ 64,927.61

The jury's verdict, on the other hand, was $65,000.00, thus
leading to the inescapable conclusion that the jury relied
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on plaintiff's accounting summary of 9ross rec~ipts in making
its award.

The court's instruction concerning damages jus-

tified that erroneous result.

As stated by this Court in

Gull Laboratories. Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756,
759 (Utah 1978):
Generally, a jury verdict will only be upset where
the error committed was so substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been different in the absence of
such error.
In the instant case, the damages found
by the jury are exactly as claimed in the inadmissible summary; hence, we are compelled to conclude
that the jury relied on the summary in making its
award.
For these reasons the judgment is reversed
and the case is remanded for a new trial.
B.

The Court Did Not Instruct The Jury As To
The Relevant Time Period For Which Damages
Could Be Computed.

Instruction No. 21 submitted by the Court not only
failed to instruct the jury that no damages could be awarded
for the time period prior to July 1, 1977, but permitted
the jury .to speculate concerning future damages beyond the
date of trial.

In plaintiff's Complaint and its Response

to Defendants' Motion in Limine, the plaintiff stated that
it did not claim any damages for any act that occurred prior
to July 1, 1977 (Page 894).

Accordingly, defendants re-

quested that the Court instruct the jury that it must limit
its consideration of the plaintiff's claims and damages to
the period following July 1, 1977 (Page 1010).

The instruc-

tion was rejected by the Court.
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In Guntert v. City of Stockton, supra at 699, the Court
stated that a computation of damages which included a time
period preceding any actual breach of contract or wrongful
conduct would not be permitted.

In addition, the Court

stated that in cases where only a partial breach occurs,
the injured party may recover damages for non-performance
only to the time of trial and may not recover future damages.

Id. at 702.

Such a result is particularly mandated

where the plaintiff continues in business and seeks injunctive relief, as in the present case.

Id.

The evidence before the court in the present case clearly
showed that the plaintiff was not claiming any damages prior
to July 1, 1977.

However, the evidence also showed that,

during the first six months of 1977 (prior to any allegedly
unlawful conduct by defendant), plaintiff's gross income
was $25,869, compared to gross income of $34,497 during the
same six-month period in 1976.

Consequently, plaintiff had

experienced an actual decline of gross income from its theater
operations during the above time period of $8,628, representing a 25% decrease, prior to the time the plaintiff claimed
that defendant engaged in any unlawful conduct (Pages 19161917).

Instruction No. 21 provided no time limitation for

the computation of damages and permitted the jury to speculate that the loss of gross receipts, as well as any other
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losses for the entire year of 1977 and future losses, could
be awarded.

It should also be stressed that the above in-

struction permitted the jury to review plaintiff's claims
in total in assessing damage, without any guidance from the
court with respect to the fact that the sign was not removed
until November 4, 1977, and the Perkins' restaurant did not
even open for business until November 7, 1977.

Even so,

Instruction No. 21 permitted the jury to assess damages
without regard for these dates.
C.

The Court's Instructions Permitted The Jury
To Award Damages For Diminution Of The Parking
Area To The South Of Plaintiff's Theater.

Instruction No. 21 stated that compensation for wrongful damage to the plaintiff's property could be awarded.
Again, this instruction is too broad and erroneously permitted the jury to conclude that it was authorized to find
damages to plaintiff's leasehold interest resulting from
claimed improper construction by defendant in the common
parking area to the south of the theater.

It should be em-

phasized that there was absolutely no evidence presented at
trial in support of any damage resulting from the construetion of the accessway and landscaped area, even assuming
that such construction was wrongful.

Plaintiff failed to

lay any foundation whatever for the testimony of John Brown,
its real estate appraiser (Pages 2098-2101).

Nevertheless,
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much of Mr. Brown's testimony was permitted to go to the
jury, thus permitting it to speculate concerning "the measure of value" of plaintiff's leasehold under Instruction
No. 21

(Pages 2040-2071).

In Birge v. Toppers Menswear, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 79
(Tex. 1971), the Court stated that a tenant cannot recover
lost profits and the market value of his lease also, for
such a theory would allow him a double recovery.

The Court

therefore concluded that a tenant, who sustains injury to
his business, would be made whole by allowing recovery of
lost net profits without regard to the rental value of the
premises.

Accordingly, the lower court erred in the present

case in failing to instruct the jury that no recovery could
be had for the market value of the plaintiff's Lease.
D.

The Court Failed To Instruct The Jury With
Respect To Proximate Cause On Plaintiff's
Claim For Tortious Conduct.

Paragraph 7 of Instruction No. 17 stated that the
plaintiff was claiming wrongful violation of its rights because of a willful and malicious course of conduct by defendants designed to destroy plaintiff's business and force
abandonment of its theater and lease.

The Court lumped all

of plaintiff's claims together in Instruction No. 17 and permitted the jury to render a verdict without differentiation
as to its findings based upon tortious injury to plaintiff's
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business or to plaintiff's claims of breach of lease.

Finally,

and most importantly, the jury was not instructed that, in
order to recover on its claim for tortious interference with
plaintiff's business, plaintiff must show that defendants'
conduct proximately caused the injury.
struction was required.

Clearly such an in-

See Charvos v. Bonneville Irrigation

District, 235 P. 2d 780 (Utah 1951).
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO PERMIT THE
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT WAS RELEVANT AND
MATERIAL TO VITAL DEFENSES RAISED BY DEFENDANT.
A.

The Court Refused To Permit Defendants~re
sentatives To Testify That They Had Offered
To Erect A Si~n For Plaintiff In The Common
Parking Area To The South Of Plaintiff's Leased
Premises.

The unrefutable evidence presented at the trial of the
present case showed that, following the removal of plaintiff's theater sign from the middle of the driveway in the
common parking area to the south of plaintiff's theater,
the sign sat to the side of the theater for over one and
one half years.

Mr. Bernard Reynolds, the Sandy City Plan-

ner, testified unequivocally that the City would have permitted relocation of plaintiff's sign in any part of the
common parking area to the south of the theater, provided
that the location would not create a safety problem (Pages
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2318-2320: see also pages 1874-1875).

The evidence was

also clear that a double sign on the same pylon, one for
plaintiff's theater and the other for the laundromat located immediately adjacent to plaintiff's theater, could
have also been placed in the parking lot (Page 1884).
Doyle Nelson, a director and officer of plaintiff corporation, and Mr. Reynolds further testified that plaintiff
never filed an application with Sandy City for relocation
of its sign (Pages 2037 and 2320).
However, when appellant attempted to introduce evidence that it had offered, on various occasions following
commencement of the present action, to construct a replacement sign or a double sign in the common parking area, the
Court refused to permit any such evidence pertaining to appellant's offers (Pages 2292 and 2399-2431).

Similarly,

the court refused to permit the owner of the adjacent
cleaning business testify that he had no objection to the
erection of a double sign consisting of one sign for the
cleaners and one for the theater (Page 2356).

When appel-

lant first attempted to introduce its evidence of sign
proposals, the Court stated:

"Don't want any conversation

or testimony about what took place after this lawsuit was
started."

(Page 2292).

Defendant then made a proffer of

proof with respect to the evidence that it intended to submit,
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showing that on September 22, 1978, it submitted to plaintiff an additional proposal for a double sign for which preliminary approval from Sandy City had been obtained.
Included with a letter to plaintiff of the same date were
copies of the drawing from a sign company for plaintiff's
review.

The letter also stated that "consistent with our

previous proposals in the matter, we will bear the cost of
construction and installation of such a sign upon receipt
of your approval without prejudice to any of the claims of
Penelko, Inc., in the pending litigation."

(Page 2329).

Like the earlier proposals made by defendant to plaintiff,
the proposal did not relate to settlement.

It was made

simply to enable plaintiff to mitigate its damages without
any prejudice to its claims.
Appellant also contended at the trial that the sign
proposals related to defendant's good faith and were therefore material to the issue of punitive damages.

Counsel

for appellant took the further position that such evidence
was material to the issue of mitigation of damages, but
the Court stated that the plaintiff had 'r.he responsibility
of doing what it can to mitigate damages, independent of an
offer from the defendants to help them do that" (Page 2331).
The Court stated that the two documents relating to the sign
proposals would not be admitted for any purpose.
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Under Utah law, an injured party must make a reasonable
effort to avoid loss and cannot sit idly by and uselessly
abide its time after another's breach of contract or duty,
assuming that such breach exists.

University Club v. Invesco

Holding Corporation, 504 P.2d 29 (Utah 1972); Casey v. Nelson
Brothers Construction Company, 465 P.2d 173 (Utah 1970);
Thompson v. Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 801 (Utah 1969).

This Court's

position in this regard is consistent with that of other
jurisdictions.

In Hill v. Liner. 336 A.2d 533 (D.C. 1975),

the Court stated:
Damages which may be avoided . . . are not
the direct or natural consequences of the defendant's wrong, since it is plaintiff's option to
suffer them.
In such a situation, the plaintiff
is damaged, not by the defendant's act, but by
his own negligence or indifference to the consequences. . . .
If a party fails to take reasonable precautions or make a reasonable effort to
avoid injury to his property or business, he cannot recover damages for such injuries as he could
have avoided.
Such action is especially required where the effort to mitigate is triffling but the damage resulting from a failure
to make such effort would be large.

49 Am.Jur.2d 849.

Further. the law is clear that an offer of the defendant to enable plaintiff to mitigate his damages is admissible in a contract action where plaintiff fails to avail
himself of such offer.

In Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922

-26-
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(Ark. 1970), for example, a homeowner brought an action
against the defendant contractor for damage caused by defective construction, which led to the flooding of plaintiff's house.

Soon after the defect became apparent,

defendant proposed the installation of an automatic sump
pump below the level of the ducts to prevent the flood
damage. Plaintiff, however, refused to allow the automatic
pump to be installed, insisting that he wanted to know
where the water was coming from and would accept nothing
less.

A period of two years then elapsed before the action

was finally brought.

In its decision, the Court stated:

In the main, Wawak is correct in his argument
that the Stewarts should have mitigated their damages by permitting the installation of the automatic
pump. On the record made below it is an undisputed
fact that such a pump would have avoided practically
all the itemized damages that were allowed by the
trial court. Id. at 927.
Although the pump would not have corrected the basic defect,
the Court held that the amount of plaintiff's judgment should
have been reduced to the amount necessary to correct the defeet and that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery for its
damage because of its refusal to accept defendant's proposal.
The undisputed evidence at trial in the present case
showed that plaintiff deliberately refused to take any action
to relocate its sign.

The refusal of the court, however,

-27-
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to permit defendant to introduce proper evidence relating
to defendant's repeated proposals to relocate the sign or
to construct a replacement sign at its expense constitutes
a misapplication of the law by the lower court.

Plaintiff's

duty to avoid the direct and natural consequences of any
wrong committed by defendant extends not only to what it
could do to mitigate its damages independent of an offer
from defendant to assist in such efforts, but also to reasonable proposals from defendant to assist plaintiff in
avoiding any loss that might arise from the removal of the
sign.

Identical policy considerations in favor of mitiga-

tion of damages are applicable in both instances as clearly
illustrated in Wawak and certainly would have mandated introduction of defendant's proposals in the present case,
especially since those proposals were made expressly without
prejudice to any of plaintiff's claims.

Otherwise, a plain-

tiff would be encouraged to file a suit and thereby preclude
the defendant from taking reasonable action to assist plaintiff in mitigating damages, a result offensive to the law
and contrary to proper public policy.
B.

The Court Erred In Refusing To Admit Into
Evidence The Laundromat Lease To Show That
Additional Common Parking Facilities Existed
Immediatel_y Adjacent To The Common Park~
Lot Described In Plaintiff's Lease.

One of the major issues during the trial of the present
case related to plaintiff's claim that defendants had tres-
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passed upon "plaintiff's leased parking area."

During the

presentation of plaintiff's case, plaintiff's officers testified that patrons of the Perkins Cake & Steak Restaurant
used many of the parking stalls in the parking area to the
south of plaintiff's theater.

These officers also testi-

fied that the theater patrons had very few, if any, parking
spaces within "plaintiff's leased parking area" within
which to park.

When, however, defendant attempted to intro-

duce into evidence the laundromat lease, showing that that
lease also provided for common parking facilities immediately
adjacent to the parking area described in plaintiff's lease,
the court refused to permit its introduction (Pages 1776-78).
In sustaining plaintiff's objection to keep the lease from
being admitted into evidence, counsel for defendant stated
that the lease pertained to the common parking areas.
response, the court stated:

In

"That doesn't matter" and re-

fused to consider the lease further (Pages 1776-1777).
Inasmuch as plaintiff had claimed that defendants were
trespassing on its "leased parking area," leases for properties adjacent to plaintiff's were relevant to show that
parking facilities, like the parking area to the south of
plaintiff's theater, were to be used in common by all tenants of the center and that additional common parking spaces
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existed immediately adjacent to this theater.

Throughout

the trial plaintiff referred to the area south of the theater
as its "leased parking area" when in fact it was a common
parking area.

The lower court's refusal to admit the laun-

dromat lease into evidence for purposes of showing the reciprocal and common nature of parking adjacent to plaintiff's
theater denied appellant the right to prove to the jury the
extent and nature of the common parking areas within the
center, which were available for use by plaintiff's patrons.
C.

The Court Erred In Excluding An Admission
Of Counsel That Plaintiff Had Agreed_To
A Relocation Of Its Theater Sign.

During the course of legal proceedings, all parties
are bound by the formal admissions of their counsel in the
action, whether such admissions be in the pleadings or in
open court.

Dick v. Drainage District No. 2, 358 P.2d 744

(Kan. 1961); Anderson v. Thomas, 336 P.2d 821 (Kan. 1959).
In plaintiff's petition for intermediate appeal, filed approximately one month following the removal of plaintiff's
theater sign, counsel for plaintiff stated that he, while
acting as counsel for plaintiff in this matter, had an
agreement with counsel for defendant "that Carley Coplin,
plaintiff's representative, and Marv Dobkins, defendant's
representative, would meet and select an alternative place
for the erection of plaintiff's marquee."

During the cross-
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examination of Mrs. Coplin, counsel for defendant stated
that he would read a statement to Mrs. Coplin and ask if
the statement accurately reflected her understanding.
court, however, stated:

The

"I am not going to allow you to

question her concerning anything that is set forth in that
document" (Page 1991).

Counsel for defendant then asked

Mrs. Coplin if it was her understanding that an agreement
existed for the removal and relocation of the sign in an
area to be selected by plaintiff.

Mrs. Coplin was permit-

ted to answer in the negative with no opportunity for counsel for defendant to use plaintiff's prior admission through
counsel as set forth in the above petition for intermediate
appeal.

The jury, therefore, heard substantial evidence

from Mrs. Coplin that defendant removed the theater sign
over her objections, when, in fact, the parties had an understanding that the sign would be relocated in an area of
plaintiff's choice, and appellant was denied the right to
introduce evidence in support of it.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF
THE JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S
PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS DURING THE TRIAL.
As a general rule, any misconduct on the part of the
trial judge from which it may be rightfully determined that
the jury was influenced in rendering its verdict constitutes
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prejudicial error, requiring a reversal of the judgment.
Etzel v.

Rosenbloo~,

189 P.2d 848, 850 (Cal. 1948).

The

judge presiding at the trial should conduct it in a fair
and impartial manner, refraining from making comments during the course of the trial which may lead to a prejudicial
result to one of the parties.

Id.

Under Utah law, a re-

versal of the trial court's judgment is warranted when the
conduct of the judge is so prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury verdict would have been
different in the absence of such conduct.

See Gull Labora-

tories, Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah
1978): Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966).
Such a result is particularly appropriate where, as provided
by Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced by the court's
conduct during the course of the trial.
It is also clear that a party is entitled to a reversal
of the judgment based upon a court's comment on the evidence
or other improper statements in the presence of the jury.
See Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Such statements

will constitute reversible error if a party is deprived of
a fair and impartial trial.

Glowacki v. A. J. Bayless Mar-

kets, 263 P.2d 799, 801 (Ariz. 1953).

Further, even in cases

where the comments of a judge, taken separately, may not
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justify a reversal of the judgment, if the cumulative effect
of various comments or remarks by the trial judge prejudice
the appellant's case, then the judgment will be reversed
and a new trial ordered.
(Cal. 1950).

Delzell v. Day, 223 P.2d 625, 626

Again, the test to determine such prejudice,

is whether in the absence of such comments and judicial misconduct, there is a reasonable likelihood that the result
would have been different.

See Id.

In the present case, plaintiff sought repeatedly to
qualify its expert real estate appraiser to testify concerning diminution in the value of its leasehold as a result of
the construction of a landscaped island and access way in a
portion of the common parking area to the south of plaintiff's
theater (Pages 2052-2093).

During the course of such exami-

nation, the court reiterated at least four times that the
evidence was clear that defendants had constructed improvements in the parking area leased by plaintiff and that what
the court was concerned with was the damage caused by such
construction on plaintiff's leasehold (Pages 2060-2061).
It was evident that the court had taken a position that the
construction was wrongful and that the only issue was whether
plaintiff had sustained any damage:
I don't think we need to go into what the building
itself would rent for. These people built the
building; they own it. They lease the land on
which it is built. They lease the parking area
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in front of it. The defendants came along and
made some changes in the_Earking area, and~t
we are concerned with here is what damages, if
any, were caused by those changes. And so, the
theater itself remains the same; there is no difference there.
It's the damage, if any, to the
leasehold because of the changes in the parking
area, we are concerned with here, and I think he
has got to limit his testimony and opinion with
respect to change in value of the leasehold in
that light.
(Emphasis added).
Then. during the examination of Mr. John Price, presidenl
of appellant corporation, the following exchange occurred:

Mr. Miner:

Mr. Price, would you be willing to have
the landscape and the roadway placed on
the east side of the Perkins Cake &
Steak Restaurant?

Mr. Lybbert:

Well, your Honor please, it is not placed
there.
There is no prayer that it be
placed there.

The Court:

Well, I will overrule the objection
and let him answer the question.

The Witness:

Well, may I please state this again,
your Honor, I am not trying to avoid
the question but if the lease conditions.
which is a legal document, indicates
the roadway is to be on the west, in
my frame of thinking, I would have to
say that this is the place I would put
the roadway.

The Court:

This lawsuit arises because the roadway
and landscaping is put upon the property
leased to the theater property.
It is
on their lease and this lawsuit is because
of the fact that that roadway and that
landscaping was constructed on the parking area leased to the Penelko theater.
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The Witness:

Which, your Honor, I thought we had
the common right of use also, and I
guess that is why the layout was laid
out in this way, Sir.

Mr. Lybbert:

Your Honor, may I note an objection
for the record. I do not believe this
statement of the Court is wholly accurate
in view of the lease document.

The Court:

Well, that is what the lawsuit is about
and had Mr. Price been here throughout
the trial last week, he might have understood more fully what Mr. Henderson's
question was. I simply tried to make
it more clear to him. The objection
the plaintiff has here, is you built
the roadway and the landscaped island
there on their leased property, and he
asked you whether or not you would have
any objection to moving it to the east
side of the restaurant building.

The Witness:

Yes. I would, because as I was concerned
and informed under the conditions of
our lease that this property was in
common (Pages 2206 and 2207).

In each of the above instances, the Court's comments
regarding the evidence were made in the presence of the
jury.

Not only were the Court's comments on the evidence

incorrect, but they were highly prejudicial to defendant's
case.

First, the lease provisions quoted above clearly show

that the property to the south of plaintiff's theater was
for the common parking of all tenants within the shopping
center.

The preamble to the lease stated that certain park-

ing space and access would be set aside and allotted "as
hereinafter more particularly described." Paragraph 7 of
Plaintiff's lease then clearly provided:
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All parking facilities, lighting facilities
and open spaces upon the leased premises are to be
used in common with other occupants of property
of the lessor for the maintenance and development
of a shopping center . • • •
In addition, paragraph 3 stated that the lessee would install
and maintain "all paving, lighting, curbs and gutterings,
sidewalks and other walkways necessary for the possession
and use of the said premises or required by any governmental
authority for the use of and access to the same."

In this

regard, the undisputed evidence at trial clearly established
that when the plaintiff executed its lease, there were no
sidewalks, curbs or gutters between the common parking lot
to the south of its theater and 9400 South.

Accordingly,

cars could enter into the parking facility without any control lanes or direction markers.

The undisputed evidence

also showed that Sandy City had required construction of an
access way on a portion of the common parking and access
area to the south of plaintiff's theater, as well as the
landscaped area, which was required as a traffic control
island for purposes of ingress and egress to and from 9400
South.
Based upon the above evidence, the judge's comments
were clearly erroneous.

The misstatement "that the roadway

and that landscaping was constructed on the parking area
leased to the Penelko theater" was made without regard to
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the clear provisions of the lease authorizing the construction.

The Court's repeated statements tended to reaffirm

in the minds of the jurors that the parking area belonged
to plaintiff under its lease and that the only question was
whether the construction of the "driveway and landscaping"
caused any damage to plaintiff.

It is evident that the

judge's continued comments and conclusions on this evidence
and the context in which they were made, were of such a
character as to cause the jury to believe that the court
had determined that defendant had no right to place the landscaping and access way in the common parking lot, that Mr.
Price was not telling the truth, and that the plaintiff was
entitled to any damages which the jury might find.

Further,

the repetition by the Court of such statements prejudiced
the rights of defendant and precluded defendant from having
a fair opportunity to have the jury decide the evidence without the misstatements of facts and conclusions by the Court
on these crucial issues.
The context and reasons for the above improper comments
on the evidence by the Court are illustrated by the following statements of the Court following plaintiff's attempted
proffer of proof with respect to the testimony of Mr. Brown:
I will say unequivocally that Sandy City and John
Price, or Price Rentals, had no right whatsoever
to allocate to the restaurant as its parking stalls
any of the parking space on the plaintiff's ~eased
land. Notwithstanding the fact that Sandy City
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has some statutory authority to control construction and zoning and improvements and signs and
things like that.
I do not recognize that Sandy
City or John Price or Price Rentals had any authority to give the restaurant any more interest
in the plaintiff's leased land than the regular
public had to use in that property. . . . As I
see it, what Price did in connection with the
construction of the restaurant, by that I mean
Price as grantor and Price Rentals as the lessor
to the restaurant or as the builder of the restaurant, building on property that it had leased
from the Malstroms, I don't see that Price or Price
Rentals had any authority to authorize any construction upon the plaintiff's facilities, nor do
I see that Sandy City had any authority to authorize Price Rentals or the restaurant people to
encroach upon the plaintiff's facilities, other
than the fact that I think its customers, along
with the customers of the other lessees there
under the lease to the plaintiff, had a right to
use the parking spaces in the leased parking area.
And, as I view it, your primary problem here is
the question of damages (Pages 2098-2099).
Although the above statement by the court was made outside
the presence of the jury, it is evident that the court had
taken a position early in the case, despite the clear language of the lease which authorized the construction of curb,
sidewalk and driveway improvements as required by Sandy City,
that defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct and that the
only issue was the issue of damages.

The court's position

was reaffirmed in the presence of the jury on several occasions and improperly created an impression in the mind of
the jury that appellant had no right to do what it did, and
that the only issue was whether any damage had been sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the construction of
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the access way and landscaped area.

Under the circumstances,

appellant's right to a fair trial was substantially impaired
by the court's improper and prejudicial conduct and comments

on the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to present evidence of lost
net profit at the trial, appellant is entitled to a reversal
of the court's judgment and a judgment against plaintiff of
no cause of action.

In the alternative, appellant is enti-

tled to a reversal of the judgment on the grounds that the
lower court committed substantial and prejudicial error which
had the effect of depriving appellant of its right to a full
and fair presentation and consideration of the disputed issues
in this case.

First, the court refused to admit proper evi-

dence relating to mitigation of damages, admissions of counsel for plaintiff that an agreement existed for the relocation of plaintiff's sign, and an adjacent laundromat lease
which provided for common parking facilities immediately
adjacent to those allotted to plaintiff for its use in common with other tenants of the shopping center.

Second, the

court failed to submit an instruction to the jury that in
the event defendants were liable, plaintiff only was entitled to recover its loss of "net profits", if any, and that
such lost net profit would be limited to the time period
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between July 1, 1977. and the time of trial.

Third, the

court committed material error in making repeated and improper comments on the evidence, which were not supported
by the facts of the case, and which seriously prejudiced
defendant's rights during the trial.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of March, 1980.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

·~::'ty~~~~~-::::t.::~i
By
Rex
. Madsen
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
521-9000
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